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MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN MISSOURI
With Special Reference to the Metropolitan Areas
0. E. NORTONt
1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LEGAL STATUS OF MUNICIPALITIES
It is now established beyond any question that a state may
exercise complete control over all forms and powers of local
governments within its bounds. No provision of the United
States Constitution restrains the state in this control, nor does
any other general principle operate to prevent the exercise of
absolute authority by the state over cities, towns, counties or
other subdivisions. The so-called "Cooley doctrine," once ac-
cepted in some parts of the country, has been completely rejected.
It is equally well established that the legislature of the state, in
absence of restrictions in the state constitution, is in complete
control of municipal and other local government. It may estab-
lish, regulate or destroy units of local government at will. The
powers of cities are entirely derived from the state, either from
some constitutional provision, or from legislation. Municipalities
possess no inherent powers; such powers as they possess are all
delegated, and are therefore to be strictly interpreted. Any pro-
tection which a city may claim against the legislature must be
found in the state constitution. Most states have placed in their
constitutions numerous safeguards of local self-government, pro-
hibiting certain kinds of legislative interference. But in the
absence of such guarantees, the local units have no defense
against legislative encroachment.1
In the early days of our national history, legislatures exercised
complete control over municipal government, chartering cities
by special act, and using such discriminatory methods in dealing
with different cities as seemed desirable to the members of the
representative bodies. The growth of constitutionalism in the
states since that time has produced many limitations on legisla-
tive power, and among them, restrictions on the control of cities.
At the present time, the constitutional status varies greatly
in this regard, from some instances in which the limitations on
t Assistant Professor of Political Science, Washington University.
1. Dillon, J. E., Law of Municipal Corporations (1911); McQuillin, E.,
Law of Municipal Corporations (1921).
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the legislature are unimportant to the opposite extreme of nearly
complete autonomy for municipalities. The various sorts of con-
stitutional treatments which have been used may be indicated
thus:
1. Miscellaneous specific restrictions, e. g.,
a. Complete prohibition of legislative control of certain mat-
ters, e. g., taxation for local purposes, enactment of local
ordinances.
b. Prohibition of special legislation on certain subjects, espe-
cially the chartering of cities.
c. Prohibition of special legislation on any subject, except
under certain conditions, e. g., notice in the area, or a
referendum in the area.
d. Prohibition of special legislation on any subject when gen-
eral acts will meet the need.
2. A requirement for the use of a municipal code, or "standard
charter" system, in which all cities of the state are under the
same regulations.
3. A requirement for the classification of cities, with general
regulations applying to all cities in a class; the details of the
classification may be found in the constitution, or in the
statutes.
4. Permission to use the optional charter system, in which the
statutes authorize cities to choose among alternative plans of
government.
5. "Legislative" home rule, in which case the legislature is
authorized to permit cities to draft their own charters, within
limits set forth in the statutes.
6. Constitutional home rule, in which the right to draft charters
is conferred on cities by constitutional provision, protected
against interference by the legislature.
These methods are applied singly or in combination in the
various states, with no two systems identical. The wisdom of
all has been vigorously debated, and it can not be said there is
general agreement on any point. Perhaps the principle which
the greatest number of authorities can accept is that the system
in most states is far too complex. Certainly it is agreed that it
should be as simple and as clear as possible.
Unfortunately, phraseology in a constitution is not always
self-enforcing, nor is it always so clear of intent that no distor-
tion is possible. The result is that the state courts have in many
cases permitted legislation which directly contravenes the obvi-
ous design of the writers of the constitutional provisions. In this
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol27/iss3/5
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connection, the courts are influenced by the principle that the
legislative power is plenary as to all subjects within state control,
except as limited by the state constitution, and hence the benefit
of the doubt is in favor of the legislature, when its action is
attacked. Consequently, the various methods used to protect
municipalities from excessive legislative interference have all
been found wanting on occasion in various states.
In the final analysis "the constitution is what the court says
it is," and the courts have not infrequently found that restric-
tions do not restrict.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN
MISSOURI
The situation in Missouri is particularly complex. Of the de-
vices indicated, only the second and fifth are missing, and there
is apparently no bar to the fifth. All of the specific restrictions
mentioned are included in the Missouri constitution. A general
code is apparently forbidden by the requirement of classification.
Optional charters are provided by statutes in two classes. Home
rule is set forth in the constitution, and there would appear to be
no good reason to prevent the legislature from allowing all or any
cities the same privilege. Here, then, is an excellent example
of the complexity which should be avoided. Experience has
demonstrated that complexity of statutory provisions may well
destroy simplicity of constitutional phraseology, and when the
constitutional items are themselves complicated, the confusion be-
comes worse confounded as indeed is the case in Missouri.
The constitutional provisions fall naturally into two groups:
those relating to municipalities in general, and the home rule
sections.
The legislature is required by the constitution of Missouri to
classify cities and towns into not more than four classes. Powers
of each class are to be defined by general law, applying the same
provisions to all cities of the same class. Provision must be made
for cities or towns existing under special charters formerly
granted, which may choose to come within the classification
established by law.2 Provision is made, to be implemented by
statute, for the consolidation of city and county governments,
2. Mo. Const. (1875) art. IX, §7.
1942]
Washington University Open Scholarship
408 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27
in any county containing a city of more than 100,000 inhabi-
tants.3 Protection of municipalities against unreasonable inter-
ference includes prohibition of special legislation on these sub-
jects: regulating the affairs of cities; changing the names of
persons or places; authorizing the laying out, opening, altering
or maintaining roads, highways, streets or alleys; vacating roads,
town plats, streets or alleys; incorporating cities, towns or vil-
lages, or changing their charters; creating offices or prescribing
the powers and duties of officers in cities; regulating the fees or
extending the powers of aldermen; legalizing the unauthorized
or invalid acts of any officer of any municipality; or enacting
any special legislation when a general law can be made applica-
ble. The question of the applicability of a general law is spe-
cifically made a judicial question.4 It is further provided that
when special legislation is to be passed, notice thereof must have
been given by publication in the locality affected, thirty days
prior to the introduction into the legislature of the bill, and such
notice shall be exhibited in the legislature before passage of such
act.5 The legislature is forbidden to levy local taxes for local
purposes.6 Certain restrictions are placed upon municipalities:
they are forbidden to subscribe to capital stock of any railroad
or any other corporation; or to lend their credit for the benefit
of any such association, or in aid of any college or other institu-
tion of learning, state or private; fees of no "executive or minis-
terial" officer shall exceed $10,000 annually, exclusively of sal-
aries paid to deputies. 7 Under certain circumstances, no person
may hold municipal and state office at the same time, or two
municipal offices at the same time. No city may be released from
its share of taxation, nor may taxes be commuted., The tax rate
for municipal purposes is limited on a sliding scale based on both
population and assessed valuation, with certain exceptions10
Municipal indebtedness is limited to the amount of the annual
revenue, except by a two-thirds vote of the residents, and then
is limited in terms of the assessed valuation and the population,
3. Mo. Const. (1875) art. IX, §8. No legislative action has been taken
under this section.
4. Mo. Const. (1875) art. IV, §53.
5. Mo. Const. (1875) art. IV, §54.
6. Mo. Const. (1875) art. X, §10.
7. Mo. Const. (1875) art. IX, §13.
8. Mo. Const. (1875) art. IX, §18.
9. Mo. Const. (1875) art. X, §9.
10. Mo. Const. (1875) art. X, §11.
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with certain exceptions, especially for St. Louis, and for the pur-
chase or construction of public utilities. 1
As regards home rule, Missouri may claim some preeminence,
for the first home rule provisions in the United States are to be
found in the Missouri Constitution of 1875. Missouri extends
the privilege to all cities over 100,000 population, which, at pres-
ent, are St. Louis and Kansas City. There are two home rule
provisions in the Missouri constitution. The general provision
authorizes any such city to elect a charter commission, which is
then to frame a charter and submit it to the voters. If adopted,
such charter supplants existing legislation regarding the form
and powers of the city.'2 Amendments to the charter may be
adopted by a majority of the voters, on proposal by charter com-
mission, or by the legislative authorities of the city."s
Special attention was given to the problem of the metropolitan
area of St. Louis. It was provided that the city might extend its
limits to include outlying districts, and at the same time secede
from St. Louis County, and adopt a charter for its own govern-
ment. The election of a board of freeholders was authorized,
which should prepare two documents: a scheme of separation
of the city and the county, and a charter for the government of
the city. The scheme being approved by the majority of the
voters of the whole area, and the charter by the majority of the
voters of the enlarged city, "shall become the organic law" of
the city and the county, superseding the former charter and all
special laws relating to St. Louis County inconsistent therewith. 4
Amendments to the charter may be adopted by the voters of the
city on proposal by the municipal legislature, a three-fifths
majority of those voting on the proposition being required for
adoption. (The home rule principle does not apply to the
"Scheme," and the legislature has frequently modified the status
of St. Louis County, by general law and in particular.) The
existing charter may be replaced by a new chapter by the elec-
tion of a new board of freeholders, which then is to proceed as
indicated above. The new charter may be approved by a majority
of those voting on the proposition. 15 The city charter must be
11. Mo. Const. (1875) art. X, §§12, 12a.
12. Mo. Const. (1875) art. IX, §16.
13. Mo. Const. (1875) art. IX, §17.
14. Mo. Const. (1875) art. IX, §20.
15. Mo. Const. (1875) art. IX, §22.
19421
Washington University Open Scholarship
410 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27
in harmony with the constitution and laws of the state, except
that special provision may be made for adjustment of tax rates.
The city is exempted from all control by St. Louis County, and
itself exercises all the authority of a county within its own
borders. It is allowed the same representation as if it were a
county."8 It is specifically declared that "Notwithstanding the
provisions of this article, the General Assembly shall have the
same power over the city and county of St. Louis that it has
over other cities and counties of this State."'1 This section has
caused a great deal of dispute, since on the surface it would seem
to nullify the previous grant of autonomy.'8
In 1924, in recognition of the problems created by the growth
of the suburban area, a new provision was added, setting forth
three methods of solving the metropolitan problem. The county
might be consolidated with the city in one municipal corpora-
tion; the city might return to the county, and then reorganize
and extend its boundaries; or the city might annex portions of
the county, leaving the remainder. The procedure requires the
appointment of a board of freeholders, which is to submit a
scheme of reorganization to the voters of the city and of the
county. If approved by a majority of those voting thereon in
the city and in the county, separately, such scheme would become
the "organic law" of the territory affected.'" In 1930, another
amendment was proposed, setting forth still another possible
method of meeting the metropolitan problem-a sort of federa-
tion scheme for the whole area-but it was defeated by the
voters.2 0 There are certain other specific references to St. Louis
in the constitution, especially as regards tax power and borrow-
ing power.2 -
3. STATUTORY PROVISIONS RELATIVE TO MUNICIPALITIES IN
GENERAL
As already indicated, the legislature of Missouri has created
a highly confused mass of legislation on the subject of municipal
16. Mo. Const. (1875) art. IX, §23.
17. Mo. Const. (1875) art. IX, §25.
18. See infra, pp. 414 et seq.
19. Mo. Const. (1875) art. IX, §26.
20. Mo. Laws of 1931, 387; see also "A True Copy of Proposed Amend-
ment to the Constitution of Missouri to be voted on November 4, 1930;
Proposition No. 5."
21. Mo. Const. (1875) art. X, §§11, 12.
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government. In fact the constitutional requirements have been
stretched to the vanishing point, with regard to the classification
provision. Under color of conformity, the legislature has prac-
tically made the whole requirement of no effect.
Acting under the constitutional mandate, the legislature has
set up a classification of municipalities. All cities of 100,000 and
over are first class.22 Cities of more than 75,000 and less than
150,000 may elect to become first class.2 2 The process prescribed
involves passage of an ordinance submitting the question to the
voters, at a special election, and if the majority voting at such
election approves, then the city will be incorporated under the
laws affecting first class cities.2 ' All cities of 30,000 and less
than 100,000 population are second class cities. 2 Cities of more
than 27,500 and less than 75,000 population may elect to become
second class.2 6 Cities and towns of 3,000 and less than 30,000
population are third class cities.2 7 Cities and towns of 500 and
less than 3,000 population are fourth class cities, and all towns
previously chartered under special laws, having less than 500
population may elect to be fourth class cities.28 Any village hav-
ing more than 200 inhabitants may by majority vote of the
qualified electors therein elect to become a city of the fourth class.
All other towns "not now incorporated" containing less than 500
inhabitants are declared to be villages,2 9 thus in effect creating
a fifth class.
But this is not the end of evasion of the constitution. There
is a group of regulations applying to all cities, towns, and vil-
lages, 0 and in addition to this general classification there have
been set up a number of special classifications. There is a group
of regulations applying to all cities, towns and villages of 30,000
and less,8 ' another group applicable to cities of 2,000 to 30,000,32
another affecting all over 100,000, 33 another for all between








80. Art. 11, §7807 et seq.
81. Art. 16, §7530 et seq.
82. §7554.
33. Art 22, §7574 et seq.
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50,000 and 250,00034 and others too numerous to mention.315
These laws concern a wide variety of subjects, conferring various
powers, and applying numerous restrictions. There have also
been created certain special classifications for special purposes,
as for example a group of regulations affecting cities of 600,000
inhabitants and over, with regard to the deposit of funds,830 and
another group affecting construction of sewer systems in certain
cities.37
When this process of elaboration of the classification system
was in its early stages, the Missouri Supreme Court held such
action to be unconstitutional. 38 An act authorizing all cities of
300,000 inhabitants or more to exclude "any business avocation"
from certain boulevards was declared to violate the requirement
that there should be not more than four classes.3 9 In later cases,
however, this ruling was overturned, and such special classifica-
tions have been upheld, even when the classification in question
contained only one city.40 The result is that in effect the consti-
tutional protection against special legislation is of little real sig-
nificance, and the classification system has become far more com-
plicated than was contemplated.
It is clearly established that the special constitutional status
of St. Louis and Kansas City excludes these two cities from the
general system of classification, and that they are not affected
by legislation for first class cities.41 The special classifications,
however, do apply to these two cities, except that the legislature
may not act on a matter distinctly of "local" concern, and indeed
it is held that because the constitution makes them special cases,
the legislature may act upon them directly and by name, in
elaboration of the constitutional status.42 The result is that a




38. St. Louis v. Dorr (1898) 145 Mo. 466, 46 S. W. 976.
39. Mo. Const. (1875) art. IX, §7.
40. State ex rel. McCaffery v. Mason (1900) 155 Mo. 486, 55 S. W. 636.
41. City of St. Louis v. Bircher (1879) 7 Mo. App. 169, aff'd (1882) 76
Mo. 431; Kansas City v. Stegmiller (1899) 151 Mo. 189, 52 S. W. 723;
State ex rel. MeCaffery v. Mason (1899) 155 Mo. 486, 55 S. W. 636; State
ex rel. Carpenter v. St. Louis (1928) 318 Mo. 870, 2 S. W. (2d) 713.
42. State ex rel. Carpenter v. St. Louis (1928) 318 Mo. 870, 2 S. W.(2d) 713; State ex rel. Zoo Board v. St. Louis (1928) 318 Mo. 910, 1 S. W.(2d) 1021.
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great deal of special legislation affecting the two great cities is
now in effect.4
3
Forms of municipal government, and functions of officials,
have been provided for the four classes of cities, and for towns
and villages.- First class cities, of which St. Joseph is the only
example, are provided with a standard form of municipal govern-
ment, while second class cities may choose between two forms,
and third class cities may choose among three types. In fourth
class cities, and in towns and villages, there is no choice, but the
form varies slightly in the villages, as between the larger and
the smaller communities.
The grant of powers, in most cases, is fairly liberal, including
a detailed statement, and a general grant as well. As might be
expected, greater attention is paid to the powers of the larger
cities. The courts of Missouri have held quite closely to Dillon's
Rule of interpretation of powers of cities, placing the burden on
the city to justify the exercise of power. 45 With regard to one
subject, the Missouri courts have held that no implied powers
exist. The legislature has provided that occupations or vocations
may be taxed by a city only when specifically mentioned in the
delegation of power.46 The supreme court has held that the doc-
trine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius holds, in spite of
any general or supplementary grant of power.4 7 When such
power has been granted, by specific mention, a later general act
will not repeal such grant, even if the act contains a "general
repealer" clause. Express delegation can be repealed only by
specific mention.
It appears, therefore, that the legislature, with the approval
of the courts, has created a situation quite different from that
which observation of the constitution would suggest. Instead of
being protected from special legislation by the constitution, the
cities are subject to continual intervention by the legislature,
under color of the classification. Indeed, the guarantees are of
so little value that the courts are no longer burdened with the
task of administering them.
43. See infra pp. 420 et seq.
44. R. S. Mo. (1939) §§6223-7242.
45. See supra, p. 405. Municipal powers are limited by the common law
as well as by statute.
46. R. S. Mo. (1939) §7440.
47. Ex parte Siemens v. Shreeve (1927) 317 Mo. 736, 296 S. W. 415.
Ex parte Keane v. Strodtman (1929) 323 Mo. 161, 18 S. W. (2d) 896.
1942.1
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4. HOME RULE IN PRACTICE
Theoretically, in examining the practice of home rule in any
given circumstances, it should be necessary only to read the con-
stitutional grant of power, and then turn to the charters adopted
thereunder. The presumption is, or should be, that the legislature
has nothing to do with the municipal government of home rule
cities. The cities are in effect granted the power of legislation,
as affecting themselves, which formerly rested with the state
legislature. A home rule charter, it is agreed, is a statute, rank-
ing with other statutes, but possessing the distinguishing char-
acteristic that it cannot be repealed by the legislature. It was
enacted by the city in its own legislative capacity, and can be
repealed only by the authority which originally gave it force.
(This idea that legislative power can be exercised by other agen-
cies than the regular legislative body is also expressed in the
initiative and referendum, as well as by the rule-making power
of administrative or judicial agencies.)
In no case, however, is the situation so simple, and in this state
such a presumption would lead to definitely erroneous conclu-
sions. In fact, it might almost be said that the presumption must
be reversed, to give a clear statement of the actual practice in
Missouri. Here it is necessary to read endless pages of statutes
and equally extensive decisions of the courts before the ultimate
situation is revealed, and then it lacks a great deal of the clarity
and simplicity so much to be desired. The fact is that home rule
cities in Missouri are not free from legislative control. They are
subject to such constant intervention by legislation that it might
be said they are less free than are those cities not blessed with
the home rule privilege. Indeed, as will shortly appear, the home
rule status of St. Louis has been used by the courts to justify
legislation for the city specially, and by name!
In order, therefore, to understand the practice of home rule
in Missouri, it is necessary to examine the judicial application
of the constitutional guarantees and the legislation which has
been approved by the courts as affecting the home rule cities,
in addition to the charters themselves, which should be the con-
trolling factors. In many respects, especially in St. Louis, the
statutes are more important than the charter.
It is plain that the legal status of St. Louis rests on a different
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol27/iss3/5
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constitutional basis from that of Kansas City. Whereas Kansas
City's charter was adopted under the general provisions of sec-
tion 16 of article IX, applying to all cities of over 100,000 popu-
lation, the charter of St. Louis was adopted under the constitu-
tional authority of section 20, as is evidenced by the procedure,
and the act of separation from the county which is not authorized
by section 16.4
This question first arose on a dispute over methods of amend-
ing the charter, there being provided in section 17 a method for
amending charters adopted under section 16; the court said:
* * * Section 17 limits its application to charters "framed
and adopted under the authority of Section 16." * * * As
the present charter was not framed and adopted under the
authority of Section 16 it cannot be amended by complying
with the provisions of Section 17.
We thus agree * * * that the city of St. Louis derives its
corporate existence and charter powers exclusively under
Sections 20 to 23, both inclusive, of Article IX of the Con-
stitution, and the present charter cannot be amended under
Section 17 of Article IX of the Constitution."
But this is the whole extent of the distinction, and on other
questions of constitutional status, the two cities are treated alike;
decisions regarding one being consistently cited as regards the
other. The declaration in section 25 that the "legislature shall
have the same power over the city and county of St. Louis that
it has over other cities and counties of this state," by naming
St. Louis, instead of referring to all home rule cities, seems to
create a special situation which would give the legislature greater
control over St. Louis than over Kansas City. While in practice,
this seems to be the case, the courts have not yet declared the
distinction.
Following the general rule accepted in the courts of other
states, the Missouri courts have attempted to distinguish between
"local" matters, and "general" or "state" concerns. Such dis-
tinction obviously presents difficulty. The Missouri Supreme
49. St. Louis v. Sternberg (1879) 69 Mo. 289; Kansas City v. Stegmiller
(1899) 151 Mo. 189, 52 S. W. 723; State ex rel. Halsey v. Clayton (1910)
226 Mo. 292, 126 S. W. 506; Lefman v. Schuler (1927) 317 Mo. 671, 296
S. W. 808; State ex rel. Hussman v. St. Louis (1928) 319 Mo. 497, 5
S. W. (2d) 1080.
50. State ex rel. Hussman v. City of St. Louis (1928) 319 Mo. 497, 506,
5 S. W. (2d) 1080.
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Court has held that the reserved power of the legislature extends
to all matters of "state" or "public" interest, and that nothing
in the city charter can supersede that authority. 1 But this does
not mean that the legislature can amend the charter of the city,
with regard to "local" matters.52
The United States Supreme Court has declared that the re-
served control existing in the general assembly under this section
does not affect the fact that under sections 20 and 21 the charter
of St. Louis is an "organic act."5 8
The "organic" nature of the charter has been further ex-
pounded in various cases in which it is held that the powers con-
ferred upon the municipality by the Constitution of 1875 and
later amendments are valid and binding on all matters within
their scope.54
The charter so conferred and adopted (even though drawn up
by the city itself) constitutes a direct delegation to the munici-
pality of the legislative power of the state, with regard to matters
of "local" concern.55 And such delegation is not in violation of
the maxim that legislative power cannot be delegated, since this
is an original grant, an act of sovereignty, 'and not a secondary
delegation by one legislative authority to another. 0
The powers thus conferred are a part of the police power of
the state,57 and thus the city acts as the direct agent of the state
51. Ewing v. Hoblitzelle (1885) 85 No. 64, rev'g 15 Mo. App. 441; State
ex rel. Zoo Board v. St. Louis (1928) 318 Mo. 910, 1 S. W. (2d) 1021.
52. City of St. Louis v. Dorr (1898) 145 Mo. 466, 46 S. W. 976;
Haeussler Inv. Co. v. Bates (1924) 306 Mo. 392, 267 S. W. 632.
53. City of St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co. (1892) 149 U. S. 465;
Withnell v. Ruecking Const. Co. (1919) 249 U. S. 63.
54. Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co. (1897) 140 Mo. 458, 41 S. W. 943;
Grand Ave. Ry. Co. v. Citizens' Ry. Co. (1889) 148 Mo. 665, 50 S. W. 305;
City of St. Louis v. Liessing (1905) 190 Mo. 464, 89 S. W. 611; Stanton v.
Thompson (1910) 234 Mo. 7, 136 S. W. 698; State ex rel. Graham v.
Seehorn (1912) 246 Mo. 541, 151 S. W. 716; McGhee v. Walsh (1913)
249 Mo. 266, 155 S. W. 445; Komen v. St. Louis (1926) 316 Mo. 9, 289
S. W. 838; State ex rel. Kansas City v. Lucas (1927) 317 Mo. 255, 296
S. W. 781.
55. Ex parte Smith (1910) 231 Mo. 111, 132 S. W. 607; City of St.
Louis v. Nash (1924) 260 S. W. 985.
56. State ex rel. Crow v. Lindell Ry. Co. (1899) 151 Mo. 162, 52 S. W.
248; City of St. Louis v. Fisher (1902) 167 Mo. 654, 67 S. W. 872; Meier
v. St. Louis (1903) 180 Mo. 391, 79 S. W. 955; Sluder v. St. Louis Transit
Co. (1905) 189 Mo. 107, 88 S. W. 648; Jennings Heights Land & Impr.
Co. v. St. Louis (1914) 257 Mo. 291, 165 S. W. 741.
57. State ex inf. Barker v. Merchants' Exchange (1916) 269 Mo. 346,
190 S. W. 903.
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in their exercise. No charter will be held to violate the consti-
tution of the state, if any other rational interpretation can be
placed upon it.58 In upholding a Sunday closing ordinance, the
court said:
* * * the implication of the city's power arising out of the
grant of its corporate existence by the State is sufficiently
evident to authorize the enactment and enforcement of the
ordinance. To hold otherwise would be to deprive the city
as an entity and a recognized subdivision of the State of one
of the powers necessary to perform its functions. Put more
strongly, the exercise of the police power by a city * * * is
one of the municipal functions necessarily and inseparably
incident to its existence as a corporation.59
In a Kansas City case,60 the court said:
The charter * * * being a law for the government of the
municipality, it is binding upon all courts, and it violates
no principle of our government to say that the courts, when
called upon, must enforce these municipal laws unless they
conflict with the Constitution, and are not in harmony with
the Constitution and laws, and, as already said, mere differ-
ences in details do not render such laws inharmonious. So
long as Kansas City does not invade the province of general
legislation, or attempt to change the policy of the state as
declared in her laws for the people at large, it will not be
held to be out of harmony with such laws, notwithstanding
the provisions of the special charter may be different from
the general statutes prescribed for the government of other
cities.
This doctrine was cited with approval in later cases involving
St. Louis. 1
In the interpretation of the city's powers, the courts of Mis-
souri have clearly accepted Dillon's Rule that the powers of a
municipal corporation do not exist unless expressly conferred or
necessarily implied.8 2 It would seem, therefore, that section 35
of article I of the St. Louis Charter is of little or no force.63 Yet
58. Pitman v. Drabelle (1916) 267 Mo. 78, 183 S. W. 1055.
59. Komen v. St. Louis (1926) 316 Mo. 9, 14, 289 S. W. 838.
60. Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co. (1897) 140 Mo. 458, 471-472, 41 S. W.
948.
61. City of St. Louis v. DeLassus (1907) 205 Mo. 578, 104 S. W. 12.
62. City of St. Louis v. Atlantic Quarry & Const. Co. (1912) 244 Mo.
479, 148 S. W. 948.
63. The city shall have power "to exercise all powers granted or not
prohibited to it by law, or which it would be competent for this charter to
enumerate."
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in some instances, a more liberal attitude is shown, when, for
example, it is held that the presumption is always in favor of
the validity of an ordinance in the exercise of the police power,0 '
and when it is said by the court that "The authority of cities to
pass ordinances for its (sic) government is legislative in char-
acter, and is derived from the common law, established by long
practice in local self-government; it is not a delegation from the
law-making body of the State,"65 thus suggesting the doctrine of
powers inherent in the nature of a municipal corporation. This
doctrine, however, was later vigorously denied.60
The charter, of course, must always be in harmony with the
constitution and laws of the state,67 and when the charter or any
ordinance is or becomes in conflict with prior or subsequent
statutes on state policy, the action of the city must give way
before the superior authority.66  With regard to "local" or
"municipal" matters, a home rule charter supersedes a statute.09
In all such cases, the distinction between "state" or "govern-
mental" matters on the one hand, and "local" or "municipal" or
"corporate" matters on the other hand, is determinative. In any
case, rights acquired, or actions taken under a charter are not
invalidated by a later statute, provided, of course, that they were
not ultra vires ab initio.70
With regard to the "reserved" powers of the legislature, there
seems to be some confusion. A long line of cases holds that such
power can be delegated to municipalities only by express grant.7 1
64. Bellerive Inv. Co. v. Kansas City (1926) 321 Mo. 969, 13 S. W. (2d)
628; Thompson v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Co. (1934) 334 Mo. 958, 69 S. W.
(2d) 936.
65. Haeussler Inv. Co. v. Bates (1924) 306 Mo. 392, 410, 267 S. W. 632;
Komen v. St. Louis (1926) 316 Mo. 9, 289 S. W. 838.
66. Kansas City v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. (1935) 337 Mo. 913,
87 S. W. (2d) 195.
67. Ewing v. Hoblitzelle (1884) 85 Mo. 64; State ex rel. Crow v. Lindell
Ry. Co. (1899) 151 Mo. 162, 52 S. W. 248; State ex rel. Goodnow v. Police
Commissioners (1902) 184 Mo. 109, 71 S. W. 215; State ex rel. Garner v.
Missouri & K. Tel. Co. (1905) 189 Mo. 83, 88 S. W. 41; State ex rel.
McNamee v. Stobie (1906) 194 Mo. 14, 92 S. W. 191.
68. State ex rel. McNamee v. Stobie (1906) 194 Mo. 14, 92 S. W. 191;
Badgley v. St. Louis (1898) 149 Mo. 122, 50 S. W. 817; City of St. Louis v.
Meyer (1904) 185 Mo. 583, 84 S. W. 914.
69. McGhee v. Walsh (1913) 249 Mo. 266, 155 S. W. 445.
70. State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Missouri Pac. Ry. (1914) 262 Mo.
720, 174 S. W. 73.
71. State ex rel. Garner v. Missouri & K. Tel. Co. (1905) 189 Mo. 83,
88 S. W. 41; City of St. Louis v. Bell Tel. Co. (1888) 96 Mo. 623, 10 S. W.
197; City of St. Louis v. St. Louis Transfer Co. (1914) 256 Mo. 476, 165
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The latest declaration, however, seems to oppose this ruling, in
speaking of the powers of St. Louis:
The term "city government" is thus interpreted to mean
the government framework and functions of which are set
forth in the charter. Thus the independence of the city from
legislative control is limited to strictly municipal matters.
That broad statement, however, may be qualified. The
city's charter powers are not limited to its mere corporate
functions. Between that narrow field and territory occupied
by general legislation is ground upon which the city under
its charter powers may venture if it sees fit, but not contrary
to general law, even though its action is only local in its
effect.72
No further elaboration of this doctrine can be found, and indeed
it is obiter dictum in the case.
In one case, it was held that the powers of the city of St. Louis
are limited by the common law, as well as by statutory action.73
The constitution requires that the charter shall be "in harmony
with and subject to the Constitution and laws,"74 and the courts
held that the "laws" included the common law, at least as regards
rights in real property. "A state legislature has inherent power
to change the (common) law in this regard, as in all others,
when the change does not infringe some Constitutional rule of
property; but the city has no power to do so unless the legislature
delegates it."' 75
The principal consideration in any home rule city is the charter
and the form and practice of government instituted thereby.
Home rule merely transfers from the legislature to the people
of the community the power to charter the city and to define its
powers. Acting under the provisions of the constitution, the two
great cities of Missouri have adopted charters for their own
government. It may be said that there is no general dissatis-
S. W. i077; St. Louis v. Bell Place Realty Co. (1914) 259 Mo. 126, 168
S. W. 721; State ex rel. Goodnow v. Police Commissioners (1902) 184 Mo.
109, 71 S. W. 215; City of St. Louis v. Public Serv. Comm. (1918) 276
Mo. 509, 207 S. W. 799.
72. State ex rel. Carpenter v. St. Louis (1928) 318 Mo. 870, 892, 2 S. W.
718.
73. Carpenter v. Reliance Realty Co. (1903) 103 Mo. App. 480, 77 S. W.
1004.
74. Mo. Const. (1875) art. IX, §23.
75. Carpenter v. Reliance Realty Co. (1903) 103 Mo. App. 480, 493, 77
S. W. 1004.
1942]
Washington University Open Scholarship
420 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27
faction with the form of the municipal government of St. Louis,
which is fairly typical of the so-called "strong mayor" type.
Likewise, there is no serious general objection to the form of
government in Kansas City, which is that commonly known
as the "manager" or "council-manager" type, and the difficulties
in which the city has found itself arise from maladministration,
not from defects in the plan. Since the great scandals of recent
years, Kansas City has undergone a considerable reform, with
consequent general improvement in the administration of civic
affairs.
An attempt to unravel the maze of statutory provisions affect-
ing the great cities involves an enormous task. As indicated
earlier,78 the practical result of a long series of legislative enact-
ments has been to create a situation which seems quite contrary
to the constitutional intent. There can be no objection to any
incidental effect on the cities of any general legislation affecting
matters of concern to the state at large. But when legislation
for municipalities is applied to home rule cities, there is, to say
the least, a question of its legitimacy, for the whole purpose of
home rule is to free the cities from legislative control. And when
the legislature establishes a condition or requirement affecting
the two cities only, or one of them only, it is obvious that the
intent of the prohibition against special legislation is violated,
as is also the requirement that there shall be not more than four
classes. Legislation of this sort falls generally into three phases:
One affecting St. Louis as a county, one applying to St. Louis by
name, and various special classifications which sometimes include
both cities, sometimes one only.
The constitutional provision for separation of St. Louis from
St. Louis County required that the city take over all county
property and assume all county debt, that the city should have
the same representation in the legislature as if it were a county,
and that it should perform the functions of a county.77 These
provisions were given effect in the "Scheme" of separation
adopted in 1876.78 Section 5 of the Scheme provides for the
election of sheriff, coroner and public administrator for the city,
section 9 and 10 transfer county property and county debt to the
76. See p. 410, supra.
77. Mo. Const. (1875) art. IX, §23.
78. R. S. Mo. (1939) pp. 3973-3984.
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city, section 24 confers on the municipal assembly the former
powers of the county court in the city area, and various other
sections apply the principle further.
The "county" aspect of the enlarged city was recognized in
the charter in the provision that the city collector shall perform
the duties formerly required of the county collector.79 The
statutes recognize this "county" status in no uncertain terms.
All acts placing any duty on a county court are applicable to the
municipal assembly of St. Louis. 0 The same is true of other
officers of a county, their functions being required of the corre-
sponding city officials.- The city register is made the counter-
part of the county clerk.82 Under chapter 100, Political Subdi-
visions, it is declared: "This State is divided into one hundred
and fourteen counties and one city."83 This would seem to indi-
cate that the city is regarded as a "political subdivision" but
not a county. But at another place it is declared: "whenever the
word 'county' is used in any law, general in its character to the
whole State, the same shall be construed to include the city of
St. Louis, unless such construction be inconsistent with the evi-
dent intent of such laws, or of some law specifically applicable
to such city." 8' The separation of the city from the county did
not relieve the city from all statutes affecting counties; only from
those especially applied to St. Louis County, and such as are
inapplicable. Such statutes as are not inconsistent with the
altered status remain in force until repealed.85
It will be noted that none of the passages cited expressly de-
clares the city to be a county. The question may be purely aca-
demic, but the courts have dealt with it at considerable length,
with the general result that it is held not to be a county in the
full legal sense, but in practical effect it is.86
The result is that the city of St. Louis is subject to the general
statutes relative to functions of counties, and has essentially the
79. Charter (1876) art. XV, §§19, 20.
80. R. S. Mo. (1939) §15744.
81. R. S. Mo. (1939) §15745.
82. R. S. Mo. (1939) §15746.
83. R. S. Mo. (1939) §13548.
84. R. S. Mo. (1939) §655.
85. State ex rel. Burden v. Walsh (1879) 69 Mo. 408; Brown v. Marshall
(1912) 241 Mo. 707, 145 S. W. 810.
86. Northcutt v. Eager (1896) 132 Mo. 265, 33 S. W. 1125; Steffen v.
St. Louis (1896) 135 Mo. 44, 36 S. W. 31; Straub v. St. Louis (1903) 175
Mo. 418, 75 S. W. 100.
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full complement of officials of a county. It is clear, however,
that the municipal corporation and the "county," although they
occupy the same area, are distinct, and that the city government
has no control over "county" functions.8 7 The city has no con-
trol of the finances of the "county" officials, although the expenses
of the "county" are borne from the city treasury.
In applying the principles stated above, the court has held
that the treasurer of the city of St. Louis is a "county" officer,
and that the charter provision authorizing the mayor to appoint
such officer is void.88 The legislature, since this decision, has
made provision for the "commissioning" of the treasurer by the
mayor, and for the mayor to fill unexpired terms by appoint-
ment.89 The collector is held to be a county officer-he must be
elected in accordance with the statutes.0
It should be noted that the situation of Kansas City is not
completely parallel, since it has not been removed from Jackson
County. But both St. Louis and Kansas City are in practice af-
fected by the special classes of counties created by statute, for
particular purposes, 1 and Jackson County is dealt with as a
special case.92
The city of St. Louis as a "county" is dealt with by name in
some cases. The statutes vary from those which define the pow-
ers, duties, and compensation of the sheriff of the city of St.
Louis0 3 to those which provide for the establishment and future
control of Tower Grove Park.94
Of the provisions applying to both the great cities, the most
87. State ex rel. Jones v. Mallinckrodt Chemical Works (1913) 249 Mo.
702, 156 S. W. 967; State ex inf. Barker v. Koeln (1917) 270 Mo. 174, 192
S. W. 748.
88. State ex inf. McKittrick v. Dwyer (1939) 343 Mo. 973, 124 S. W.
(2d) 1173.
89. R. S. Mo. (1939) §§7781-7785.
90. State ex inf. Barker v. Koein (1917) 270 Mo. 174, 192 S. W. 748.
91. R. S. Mo. (1939) §§11702-11744, 11851, etc.
92. R. S. Mo. (1939) §§15660-15664.
93. R. S. Mo. (1939) §§15665-15681.
94. R. S. Mo. (1939) §§15714-15740. For examples of other statutes, see
R. S. Mo. (1939) §§15682, 15683 (coroner of city specifically recognized) ;
§15684 (functions of a county court relative to inquests required of the
mayor); §§15685-15699 (form of indemnifying bonds which may be required
in some cases specifically set forth for St. Louis) ; §§15700-15704 (St. Louis
required to establish a social evil hospital); §15741 (St. Louis Chamber of
Commerce given authority to appoint inspectors of flour and establish




general are those declared to apply to all cities, towns and vil-
lages.95 There are numerous particulars involved in this portion
of the statutes, and it is not clear that all of them apply to the
great cities. In view of the distinction made by the court between
"municipal" affairs and those of "general" concern, it might be
assumed that some of them do not apply. In some instances,
however, it is established that they do apply. For instance the
prohibition on requiring peddling licenses of farmers selling
their own produce on city streets,9 6 applies to St. Louis.97 A
somewhat elaborate definition of procedure in assessment of
damages arising from change of grade of streets98 is held to
apply 99
The next most general set of provisions establishes the zoning
power in all cities, towns and villages, except in counties having
no more than 15,000 population. M0 This grant of power affects
both Kansas City and St. Louis. 0 1
There are numerous miscellaneous provisions, such as that
denying power to cities to tax occupations not specifically named
as taxable in the charter or statute.10 2 This provision applies to
home rule cities.0 3 This prohibition, and the application of it
by the courts, results in exhaustive lists in both charters of occu-
pations declared to be taxable.''
There is an extensive group of provisions applying to cities
of more than 100,000 inhabitants.0 5 Statutes within this classi-
95. R. S. Mo. (1939) §§7307-7411.
96. R. S. Mo. (1939) §7330.
97. City of St. Louis v. Meyer (1904) 185 Mo. 583, 84 S. W. 914; City
of St. Louis v. Bernard (1913) 249 Mo. 51, 155 S. W. 394.
98. R. S. Mo. (1939) §7373.
99. City of St. Louis v. Lang (1895) 131 Mo. 412, 33 S. W. 54; Marko-
witz v. Kansas City (1894) 125 Mo. 485, 28 S. W. 642.
100. R. S. Mo. (1939) §§7412-7423. The act authorizes formation of
zoning districts, establishment of zoning commissions and boards of adjust-
ment.
101. Bellerive Investment Co. v. Kansas City (1929) 321 Mo. 969, 13
S. W. (2d) 628; Wippler v. Hohn (1937) 341 Mo. 780, 110 S. W. (2d) 409.
102. R. S. Mo. (1939) §7440.
103. Keane v. Strodtman (1929) 323 Mo. 161, 18 S. W. (2d) 896; Kansas
City v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. (1935) 337 Mo. 913, 87 S. W. (2d)
195.
104. For other provisions, see R. S. Mo. (1939) §7427 (authorizing cities
over 5,000 population to appoint women members of the police force. It is
assumed that the provision applies in St. Louis and Kansas City, in view
of the general attitude toward police matters. See infra, p. 426) ; §§7460-
7467 (requiring licensing of plumbers in cities over 15,000 population).
105. R. S. Mo. (1989) §§7574-7643.
19421
Washington University Open Scholarship
424 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27
fication vary from one authorizing such cities to acquire bridges,
tunnels and approaches, 0 6 to one defining the jurisdiction of
justices of the peace. 0 7 One of the most controversial of all the
provisions affecting both cities is that authorizing maintenance
of public libraries in cities, villages and townships. 0 8 Certain
of the provisions are made applicable to cities over 300,000 in-
habitants. Establishment of a special library tax, by a refer-
endum, the proceeds of which then must be paid from the city
treasury to the library board, was the basis of objection to the
statute. This provision was held valid as applied to St. Louis.'05 '
The Board of Estimate and Apportionment,refused to sanction
the levying and collection of the tax, and mandamus was re-
quested. In granting the petition, the court declared, inter alia,
that libraries are educational institutions, and as such subject to
control by the legislature, the home rule charter to the contrary
notwithstanding."0
Of the special classifications applying to St. Louis alone, one
applies to "all cities over 600,000 population, and to all cities not
within a county, but constituting a political subdivision and a
city in its corporate capacity.""' On this basis, St. Louis is
106. R. S. Mo. (1939) §7574. This section was applied to both great
cities. Haeussler v. St. Louis (1907) 205 Mo. 656, 103 S. W. 1034; Roy v.
Kansas City (1920) 204 Mo. App. 332, 224 S. W. 132.
107. R. S. Mo. (1939) §7588. For further examples, see R. S. Mo. (1939)
§§7575-7576 (emission of "dense" smoke within any city a misdemeanor, and
cities authorized to enact ordinances to this end); §§7577-7584 (power to
borrow money under certain circumstances conferied); §§7585-7587 (cities
required to allow 24 days' vacation with pay to police officers); §§7850-
7852 (cities of more than 75,000 population authorized to issue bonds for
acquiring public utilities) ; §§7720-7745 (cities over 300,000 shall establish
public markets; may regulate streetcar gates; office of license collector
established; duties of recorder of deeds specified). Statutory application
of the general home rule provision occupies a considerable portion of article
22, chapter 38. These sections in practice apply only to Kansas City, but
in form would apply to both. Article 25 defines when others may be made
defendants jointly with the city, in cities of more than 150,000 population
(§7687).
108. . S. Mo. (1939) §§7720-7745.
109. State ex rel. Carpenter v. St. Louis (1928) 318 Mo. 870, 2 S. W.
(2d) 713.
110. See also State ex rel. Zoo Board v. City of St. Louis (1928) 318
Mo. 910, 1 S. W. (2d) 1021, where a similar decision was rendered regard-
ing the provision for zoological parks in cities of more than 400,000, which
affects only St. Louis (R. S. Mo. (1939) §§15365-15372); and State ex rel.
Carpenter v. St. Louis (1928) 318 Mo. 871, 2 S. W. (2d) 713, which up-
held, on the same basis, the provision for art museums in cities over 400,000
(R. S. Mo. (1939) §§15705-15713).
111. R. S. Mo. (1939) §§7781-7785.
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given a housing authority,"' has its power of choosing deposi-
tories restricted and regulated,"13 and is authorized to establish
a municipal rapid transit system." 4 Numerous statutes are ap-
plicable also under the classification of cities over 500,000 in
population, as, for example, state control of police is provided
for St. Louis. 1 5 The court upheld these provisions on the ground
that police administration is distinctly a matter of "general"
concern, not "municipal" only, and hence was within the power
of the legislature."16 Other statutes in this group cover widely
varied fields."17
Of statutes affecting Kansas City alone, the most significant
is that providing state control of police in cities between 200,000
and 500,000 population.- 8 An earlier bill had been declared void
on the ground of illegal delegation of power."19 The provisions
of the present statute are essentially the same as the St. Louis
police bill.
In cities of more than 150,000 and less than 500,000, the proc-
ess of condemnation is regulated." 0 Authority to issue tax antici-
pation notes is conferred on cities of 200,000 to 600,000 inhabi-
tants. 1' Cities of 200,000 to 400,000 shall register all private
detective agencies." 2 Certain regulations applying to Jackson
county affect Kansas City incidentally." 3 The organization and
functions of the Kansas City school district are regulated under
a classification applying to all cities between 75,000 and 500,000
112. R. S. Mo. (1939) §§7853-7875.
113. . S. Mo. (1939) §7757.
114. R. S. Mo. (1939) §§7771-7780.
115. R. S. Mo. (1939) §§7688-7712. A board of police commissioners is
created, to be appointed by the governor, which exercises complete control
over the police department. The sheriff and the constables of the city are
placed under the control of the board. The police officers in such cases are
declared to be state officers as well as municipal officers. The budget esti-
mate of the board must be accepted by the municipal assembly.
116. State ex rel. Hawes v. Mason (1899) 153 Mo. 23, 54 S. W. 524.
117. See, for example, R. S. Mo. (1939) §7752 (tax rate for such cities
limited) ; §§7753-7754 (condemnation procedure defined) ; §§9464-9676
(police pensions established in St. Louis); §§7758-7770 (armory boards
established); §§7764-7768 (creation of Board of Children's Guardians
authorized) ; §§10724-10750 (St. Louis school district established and regu-
lated on basis of cities of 500,000 and over).
118. R. S. Mo. (1939) §§7644-7683; Mo. Laws of 1939, 545.
119. State ex rel. Field v. Smith (1932) 329 Mo. 1019, 49 S. W. (2d) 74.
120. R. S. Mo. (1939) §§7684-7686.
121. R. S. Mo. (1939) §§7837-7847.
122. I. S. Mo. (1939) §§7848-7849.
123. R. S. Mo. (1939) §§15660-15664.
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inhabitants, which classification includes Kansas City and St.
Joseph.24
It is difficult to imagine a more complete attack on the home
rule principle than that contained in these statutes. The appli-
cation of the distinction of "state" matters from "local" con-
cerns, seems to leave the cities with only the clearly "corporate"
functions (such as water, light and gas systems owned and oper-
ated by the city) clearly defensible against legislative interfer-
ence. In practice, the case is not quite so desperate. The legis-
lature has, in fact, left the cities free of control on many matters
which might be brought under state supervision. But the fact
remains that there is little hope that the home rule cities may
depend on the courts for any real independence. Indeed it seems
that the courts have gone out of their way to uphold any inter-
vention in the affairs of the cities which seems desirable to the
legislature. Under such circumstances, it seems proper to de-
mand that the home rule principle be made effective or that it be
abandoned.
5. CONcLUsIONS
The problem of regulation of municipal government has
plagued all the states throughout our history. But the industrial
expansion of the last seventy-five years has made it acute. The
expansion of cities, the increase in the severity of demands upon
municipal services, the difficulty of law enforcement in modern
times-these and many other influences have combined to pro-
duce a pressing need for reform.
Two principal trends may be discerned in recent years, and
they are to some degree contradictory. On the one hand, several
states have allowed to cities a large degree of freedom to deter-
mine their own forms and functions of government, this free-
dom guaranteed against legislative interference by provisions of
the state constitution. In some states the home rule privilege
is limited to a few cities, while in others a large number of
municipalities can qualify. The extent of freedom permitted to
cities under home rule likewise varies widely.
On the other hand, there has been a tendency toward direct
interference by state authority in certain specific functions in
municipal areas, with some degree of supervision or control by
124. R. S. Mo. (1939) §§10668-10723.
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state government substituted for local authority. The schools
and the administration of law enforcement are the matters most
frequently controlled in this manner. This process of interfer-
ence is in large part a reaction against "boss" rule and the evils
of local politics.
The two trends evidence a clear distrust of the legislature by
cities, and a corresponding distrust of cities by state authorities.
It is probably correct to say that both attitudes are at least in
part justifiable. It cannot be said that either course has cor-
rected the evils decried by proponents of the remedies. Nor can
it be said that experience has shown which attitude is the
sounder, as a basis for a general policy. Perhaps the most obvi-
ous conclusion is that altogether we exhibit a profound cynicism
about the efficiency of our representative system of government
on both the state and the local level.- 5
The difficulty in Missouri, then, is not unique. Other states
have faced the same problems, and have had no markedly greater
success than this state. Both trends continue, with no clear indi-
cation as to the outcome. Nor is it possible to formulate any
very definite principles which would be generally regarded as
valid as an approach to the problem. Essentially, the difficulty
rests on the question whether popular authority shall be exer-
cised on the state level or on the local level. In practice, all
states reach some sort of compromise in the matter. The par-
ticular arrangement in force is always the object of attack from
both sides, and is constantly a matter of litigation.
It is evident that the status of municipal government in Mis-
souri needs clarification and simplification. The constitutional
intent has been flouted in several ways by the legislature, and
the courts have been over-generous in permitting such legislative
action.
The constitutional requirement that there shall be no more
than four classes of cities and towns has been disregarded, in
the establishment of the class of villages, outside the fourfold
classification. It has further been violated by the almost innumer-
125. On this general subject, consult: Macdonald, A. F., American City
Government and Administration (1941) 40-101; Zink, Harold, Government
of Cities in the United States (1939) 37-110; Kneier, C. M., City Govern-
ment in the United States (1934) 32-106; National Resources Committee,
Urban Government (1939) 21-26; Jones, Victor, Met/ropolitan Government(1942) passim.
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able special classes set up for special purposes. The situation
now seems to be that the courts will uphold any such speciai
classification, even though it contains but one city, thus making
the constitutional restrictions on special legislation of slight
value. The result of the whole process is a welter of legislation
containing overlapping categories and complexities defying clear
definition or analysis.
The home rule cities, and especially the city of St. Louis, have
been subjected to a degree of legislative control which seems
clearly to violate the intent of the constitutional provisions. Al-
though the constitution seems to authorize the city of St. Louis
to exercise the powers of a county, the legislature and the courts
have forced upon the city a county government, much of which
is quite unnecessary, together with some special agencies not
found in other counties, all of which is a burden on the city
treasury, but uncontrollable by the city, either as to functions
or as to expenditures. The resultant lack of coordination of gov-
ernmental agencies in St. Louis is quite beyond the power of the
city to correct. Some support might be adduced for the status
of the police department and the school authorities, but it is
difficult to find reasonable justification for the other special agen-
cies. Kansas City has been less affected by this process, due in
large part to the fact that the city and county have not been
separated. Kansas City does have state control of police admin-
istration and election administration.
The attack on this problem might proceed in three separate
ways, or by a combination of them. The most obvious attack is
by way of changing the constitutional provisions affecting the
situation. The provisions in the Missouri constitution are for the
most part, distinctly antiquated, and modernization is quite in
order. But it is not clear that any phraseology which might be
inserted would be proof against the attacks which would inevi-
tably be made. It would be comparatively easy, however, to sim-
plify the provisions of article IX to such an extent as to make the
intent much plainer. Some more adequate protection of the inde-
pendence of home rule cities would seem to be in order.
It is also possible to approach the problem from the legislative
side. The general assembly might, by suitable pressure, be influ-
enced to bring order out of the existing confusion, or a general
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reform might be achieved by the initiative process. The difficulty
here is political; it is not easy to persuade the rural sections of
the population that the municipalities need assistance, and the
rural areas dominate the legislature. The past experience of St.
Louis in appealing to the electorate of the state does not lend
encouragement to the plan.
The third possibility is appeal to the courts. There is, however,
little hope that the courts as now constituted will reverse the
trend of the decisions and restore the original intent of the con-
stitutional provisions.
It is probably true that constitutional revision presents the
greatest hope, but it must be admitted that experience does not
justify any great optimism. There is no assurance that the re-
vised provisions would not be so distorted by interpretation as
to destroy their efficacy.
As a basis for revision, the following principles might be ac-
cepted:
1. Home rule should be retained and extended.
a. Existing provisions should be simplified and combined into
one general provision.
b. Clarification on various points should be attempted: e. g.,
the definition of "municipal" functions.
c. The "county" status of St. Louis should be clearly defined.
d. The desirability of extending home rule to other cities, and
perhaps to all counties, should be carefully canvassed.
e. Sec. 15 of art. IX should be modified to make it self-enforc-
ing; i. e., to permit city-county consolidation on the initia-
tive of the area, without statutory authorization.
2. Cities without home rule should be adequately protected.
a. The limitations on classification should be restated to pro-
hibit special classifications entirely.
b. The advisability of general administrative supervision of
municipal government should be considered.
c. It should be required that classifications be definite, thus
excluding the present optional classifications.
d. The classification of villages as now existing in the statutes
should either be abolished or constitutionally authorized.
It should be said that such revision will depend for its effect
on the extent to which popular opinion demands it effectiveness.
The attack by legislation must be expected, and if the future is
to be judged by the past, the judicial attitude will be favorable
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to legislative distortion of the constitutional restrictions. The
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